編者按：近日，中國人民大學重陽金融研究院 高級研究員劉志勤就“中國是否正在試圖改變國際秩序？”“美國和中國目前的角色”等相關議題與香港大學當代中國與世界研究中心創始主任李成在CGTN《論見中國》節目中再次對話。英籍資深時政編輯John Goodrich、CGTN社交媒體專家李菁菁擔任對話主持人。現將第五期（ ）對話中英文視頻及內容發布如下： （全文中英文約12000字，預計閱讀時間20分鐘）

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John Goodrich：歡迎收看《論見中國》節目。本節目聚焦于邀請對中國議題具有獨特視角與深厚知識的專家，展開深度對話。

李菁菁：近年來，我訪問了很多“全球南方”國家，采訪了來自這些地區的許多學者、政治人物和意見領袖。所以稍后我會把來自非洲、亞洲和拉丁美洲的聲音帶進我們的討論。

John Goodrich：謝謝菁菁。那我們就從第一個辯題開始：中國是否正在試圖改變國際秩序？

中國所奉行的基本外交理念，多數人并不陌生：致力于保障所有國家平等的發聲權利，反對戰爭沖突，支持和平事業、協商解決國際問題，并助力發展中國家的發展。然而，國際上仍存在不少質疑的聲音，部分人士對中國外交的真實意圖持有懷疑態度。《華盛頓郵報》曾刊發文章，聲稱中國正在試圖構建一個多極世界，打造一種區別于美國主導的全新國際秩序，文章標題直接點明中國正在推動構建一個新的世界秩序。可以說，中美對世界治理有著截然不同的看法。

雖然中國始終倡導踐行 “真正的多邊主義”，反對霸權主義。但是，李教授，中國真的致力于構建一個多極世界嗎？倘若如此，中國能從中獲得什么？

李成：當然，中國一直在強調多極化和多邊主義。現在我來回答你的問題——中國是否會改變國際秩序？

首先，具有諷刺意味的是，近年來，特別是最近幾周，所謂的自由國際秩序出現了嚴重崩塌，美國和歐洲地區的表現尤為明顯。這一局面并非中國所致，追根溯源，更可能是美國自身及其跨大西洋關系處理失當造成的。現在，如果你說的“有影響力的秩序” 是指聯合國主導、基于規則的秩序，那么中國無意改變它。中國和其他一些國家一樣，在當下這一關鍵歷史節點，強調聯合國的重要性。

當聚焦全球化議題時，我認為中國無疑是全球經濟體系的堅定支持者。因為中國和一些其他國家一樣，從中受益良多。

但如果你說的秩序是特朗普政府奉行的“美國優先”理念與單邊主義行徑，那么中國持明確保留態度；如果是拜登政府構建威權與民主二元對立、兩大陣營對抗的敘事，那么中國更是堅決抵制這種說法。

所以，討論中國對國際秩序的立場，首先要明確“國際秩序”指的是什么。但更為關鍵的是，我們正處在歷史的十字路口，美國主導的自由秩序已基本瓦解。需要再次強調，這并非中國的責任。當然，在某種程度上，中國始終主張對現有國際秩序進行改革，而非完全取代。并且，這一主張如今表達得比以往任何時候都更加清晰、有力。

John Goodrich：謝謝李教授。請問劉教授，中國希望從多極世界中得到什么？為什么中國希望實現多極化？

劉志勤：這是個很有趣的問題，但我的答案其實很簡單。在我看來，這本質上是一個 “需求與供給” 的問題。國際社會是否有改變全球秩序的需求？若這種需求真實且必要，那么必然會催生出相應的供給。這無疑是問題的核心所在。

正如李教授剛才提到的，我們一直在探討“現有秩序”。但我們必須反思，當下的國際秩序是否真的亟待變革？倘若答案是肯定的，那么誰有能力承擔這一重任？誰能推動全球秩序以不同的方式運作？一旦我們厘清這一根本問題，答案便會水落石出。

在我看來，中國從未主動尋求改變現行全球秩序，并且當前全球秩序的演變也并非中國單方面所能決定。舉例來說，如果西方國家持續以單邊主義、霸權主義或霸凌行徑主導國際秩序，長此以往，包括中國在內的世界各國，都會推動對這一秩序的變革。但需要著重強調的是，中國既沒有主導全球秩序變革的意圖，也沒有采取相關行動。中國的目標，是對現有國際秩序進行必要的修正與完善。

當前，聯合國以及其他負責全球事務治理的國際組織，依然在國際舞臺上發揮著重要作用。并且，從原則上來說，這些組織仍得到國際社會的廣泛認可。但在某些領域，尤其在經濟和地緣政治關系愈發緊張的形勢下，美國及部分北約國家，包括一些歐洲主要國家，時常干擾這些國際機制的正常運行。在這種背景下，無論是市場層面，還是國際社會整體，都切實產生了變革或修正現有秩序的現實需求。

毫無疑問，這的確是個很好的問題，但究竟應該由誰來承擔這一責任？我認為中國不會主動扛起這面大旗。中國作為全球化進程的重要參與者，更愿意協助其他國家營造多元的發展環境，促進各國經濟的共同繁榮。所以，結合當前的現實背景，這個問題其實不難理解。

John Goodrich：菁菁，有人提出，中國正在調整自身立場，而美國卻背離先前承諾，這是否為中國帶來全新機會與定位？你在“全球南方” 進行采訪與旅行時，當地各方是如何看待這一說法的？他們對美國和中國目前的角色有著怎樣的見解？

李菁菁：首先，我不知道是誰提出這樣的問題，但我覺得我們首先得問一句：這里所說的“秩序”，到底是指哪一種？美國政客常提及“基于規則的國際秩序”，但本質上，這不過是少數國家憑借自身權勢，主導世界上的大多數國家。我并不認同中國試圖改變世界秩序這一觀點。中國真正致力于推動的，是讓國際社會重回大家共同認可的秩序，即基于《聯合國憲章》、在二戰后共同確立的國際秩序。

我認為過去幾年，部分國家濫用權力，甚至漠視聯合國，推行它們所謂的 “基于規則的國際秩序”。這種秩序剝削大多數國家，“全球南方” 國家更是深受其害。所以，如果所指的是這種不公正秩序，那么想要改變“秩序”的絕非只有中國，整個“全球南方”都希望重塑現狀。因為他們深知，這種秩序極不公平，實質上是把“全球南方”的民眾置于不利地位。

但如果我們談的是二戰后基于《聯合國憲章》建立的國際秩序，那么中國始終嚴格遵守，從未試圖改變。實際上，在今年“兩會”期間，外交部長王毅也指出，如果每個國家都強調本國優先，都迷信實力地位，那這個世界將倒退回“叢林法則”。畢竟，強權絕不能等同于公理 。這就是我對這個問題的看法。

John Goodrich：謝謝你的分享，菁菁。我想接下來請兩位教授談談，這些理念聽起來理想嗎？比如國家之間的平等、每個國家都有平等的發言權、更小的國家也能擁有更強的聲音，以及對發展中國家的支持。但這些設想是否真能在現實中實現？尤其是在美國日趨孤立主義、西歐對自身角色感到迷茫的當下，我們真的有可能實現一個更平等的多極世界嗎？李教授，您怎么看？

李成：我們當下尚難預判局勢走向。如今，我們身處一個風云變幻的時期，充滿了不確定性和混亂。就像菁菁提到的，美國和歐洲等西方國家，總是將“基于規則的秩序”掛在嘴邊；但隨著政治局勢的演變，這種言論僅維持到拜登政府結束。你看看最近的政治敘事——從特朗普再度上任，到慕尼黑安全會議上美國副總統萬斯對歐洲的嚴厲批評——美國實際上已把歐洲國家當作“問題對象”，而非盟友。如此一來，美西方自詡的所謂秩序體系，實則早已名存實亡。

在這種情形下，現在就斷言“多邊主義能否最終占據主導”，還為時尚早。但有一點我認同劉教授的觀點：中國如今比以往任何時候都更重視全球治理。過去，“治理”一詞常被美國和其他西方國家掛在嘴邊，可現在，他們似乎已把它忘得一干二凈。所以，我們正處于一種快速的變化中。

如今，美國主導的聯盟內部，竟開始公開討論北約可能瓦解、跨大西洋關系走向崩潰，這一轉變著實令人震驚。所以，我們應該從這個角度來看待問題。當今世界，并非兩極，也不是所說的中國稱霸的格局，或者其他任何一個國家稱霸的格局。可以說，我們正實實在在地邁入多極時代。未來，世界可能不止存在三個“極”，四個、五個，甚至更多都有可能。

這就引出了一個關鍵的問題：在這種全新的經濟、政治和安全形勢下，我們究竟該如何開展有效治理？

John Goodrich：確實，有一種觀點，可能稍顯夸張，但不無道理：中美如今正走在不同的道路上，用不同方式推進各自的發展，各有不同的目標與動機。但在某種奇特的偶然下（即特朗普再次當選），我們可能真的會進入我們一直在討論的那種多極世界。

對話英文版

John Goodrich：Hello and welcome to Talking China, the show where we talk to people with unique perspectives and unrivaled knowledge about the main talking points in China today.

Li Jingjing：I visited many Global South countries and interviewed many scholars, politicians, and key opinion leaders from these regions.

So later in the conversation I will try to bring those African, Asian, and Latin American voices in the debate.

John Goodrich：Thanks, Jingjing. So let’s kick things off with Debate Topic One: Is China trying to change the international order?

China’s fundamental diplomatic approach may seem like common sense to many people: trying to give all countries an equal voice, being against war and conflict, and in favor of peace, negotiation, and supporting developing countries.

But there's also a lot of confusion in some places, and a little cynicism about the true intention of Chinese diplomacy.

We’ve got an article from The Washington Post here that argues that China is seeking to create a multipolar world, offering an alternative order to one led by the United States, with headlines saying that China is pushing to build a new world order.

Now, it’s fair to say that China and the U.S. have very different views about how the world should be run.

But hmm… while China has been a vocal advocate of what it calls “true multilateralism” and against hegemonism, is it really true, Professor Li, that China wants a multipolar world? And what would it get out of it?

Li Cheng：Well, of course, China constantly emphasizes multipolarity and multilateralism. Now to answer your question—Is China going to change the international order?

Well first, ironically, the so-called liberal international order collapsed in recent years, especially in recent weeks, particularly evident in the United States and also in Europe.

This is not caused by China—probably rather caused by the United States and its relations in terms of classic transatlantic relations.

Now, if that order you refer to the UN-led, rules-based order, no—China does not want to change it. China, just like some other countries, emphasizes the importance of the UN at this critical moment in world history.

Now, if you also ask if it’s the globalization… I think China is the country that really has strong support for economic organization, because China benefits—along with some other countries—from the economic globalization.

Now, but if you ask that if the order is what President Trump favored, like “America First” and unilateralism, of course, China has reservation.

Now, if the order refers to President Biden’s two blocs—namely authoritarianism vs. democracy—then certainly China rejects that narrative.

So, it depends on what you refer to as the international order.

But most importantly, I think we are in a very critical moment in history. The so-called U.S.-led liberal order has basically already collapsed.

Again, it’s not caused by China.

And of course, in a way, China’s argument to reform the international order—not to completely replace one—now is stronger and clearer than ever before.

John Goodrich：Thank you, Professor Li. Professor Liu, what does China think it can get out of a multipolar world? Why does China want a multipolar world?

Li Zhiqin：That’s an interesting question. But my answer is quite simple. I should say this is a question between the demand and supply side.

Whether there is demand in the global community need to change the global order—if we need, if there is a necessity to change it, I think there is a supply side.

So this is really a very important thing.

Similar as Professor Li already mentioned here that we are always trying to talk about “the order at the moment.”

But do we think there is a necessity to change today’s order? And who can be able and responsible to take this responsibility and function to make the global order work in a different way?

If we can answer this fundamental question, I think the answer is clear.

In my opinion, I think that China has never tried to change the global order at present. But it is decided by something else.

For instance, if the Western countries make the order in a different way—unilateral, hegemonist, or through some bullying actions taken…so if we follow this order, I think, including China, all over the world, are willing to change it.

But I want to say that China is not going—or is not trying—to change the global order at present.

We are just trying to modify, to improve the present order.

Because at the moment, we already have the UN and also other international organizations that make the world governance. So, in principle, they are quite welcomed by the world.
But in some aspects—especially in the economic and geopolitical tensions—some things are always disordered by the United States and by some NATO members. For instance, by some major European countries.
Under such circumstances, there is a necessity and demand from the market that such order should be changed, should be modified.

No doubt, this is a good question. But who should take this responsibility? I don’t think China will take this responsibility.

China is only one part of the globalization. China is willing to help the rest of the world to make the world modified with diversified and more opportunities to develop their own economies.

So I think the question is quite simple to be cleared with all the backgrounds.

John Goodrich：Jingjing, do you think that there’s an argument that perhaps China is transitioning its existing positions, but America is moving away from its previous commitments—which is opening up a new opportunity and a new position?
Based on your conversations with people in the Global South and your travels, what do they say? How do they feel about the U.S. role at the moment and China’s role?

Li Jingjing：I think first, I don’t know who asked those questions, but to those who ask this question, I think we need to ask: what kind of order are they referring to in this question?

Because sometimes U.S. politicians say “the rules-based international order,” which is basically a few countries using their power to dominate the majority of the world.

But I don’t think China is trying to change the world order. China is trying to call on everybody: let’s go back to the world order that we all agreed on—that was based on the UN Charter, all countries agreed on after World War II.

Because I think in the past few years, we saw some countries are abusing their power, even neglecting the UN, and following their own “rules-based international order,” which is basically exploiting the majority of countries—Global South countries.

So, if that’s the order they refer to, not just China wants to change that—the whole Global South wants to change that.

Because they know it’s unfair. It’s basically pushing the Global South people down to the bottom of the trap.

But in terms of the world order that we all agreed on after World War II, which is based on the UN Charter, that’s the thing that China has always been following. And China is not trying to change that.

And actually, during the Two Sessions, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi mentioned that if every country only achieves their own interests, puts their own interests first, then we go back to the rule of the jungle. Might does not equal right.

So that’s my thought on it.

John Goodrich：Thank you, Jingjing. What I would like to ask the two professors is, does this sound great? It’s something we can all really agree on the basis of equality for countries, that each one has an equal voice, a stronger voice for smaller countries, support for developing nations.

But is it realistic in the current world, where the U.S. is becoming more isolationist, and Western Europe is a little bit confused about its role? Is this multipolar world—where we can see greater equality—really going to see in reality? Professor Li?

Li Cheng：Well… It's still yet to see. We are in a rapid change with lots of uncertainty and confusion.

For example, Jingjing mentioned that Western countries, including the United States and Europe, constantly talk about a "rules-based order"—but only until the end of the Biden administration.

I mean, if you look at the recent narrative after Trump, and after the Munich Security Conference, when Vice President JD Vance delivered that very harsh criticism of Europe, and pointed the fact that European countries become problems rather than allies. So, the whole thing is gone.

I think it’s too early to answer your question about whether a multilateral norm will prevail.
But one thing is I agree with Professor Liu that China now—more than at any time before—emphasizes global governance.

I think the keyword “governance” previously was also frequently used by the United States and Western countries, but now, it also sounds like that term has been thrown out the window.

So again, we are in a rapid change.

You know, sometimes it’s really astonishing to see how quickly U.S.-led alliances now talk about the possible collapse of NATO, the collapse of transatlantic relations.

So I think we should put it in that perspective.

But the fact is, it’s not bipolar, not even kind of a kingdom Chinese tend to obsess, or as some other countries tend to obsess.

I think we are really entering a polar that has more than three polars.

Maybe four, maybe five, or even more.

So that raises the issue about how to govern in this kind of new situation—a new economic, political, and security landscape.

John Goodrich：Yeah, I mean—there is an argument—maybe a bit of a stretch—that the U.S. and China are on somewhat different roads, going by different means, traveling in different ways, with different intents. But we may end up in the kind of multipolar world we’ve been talking about, by a kind of strange accident of Trump returns to the White House.

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中國人民大學重陽金融研究院（人大重陽）成立于2013年1月19日，是重陽投資向中國人民大學捐贈并設立教育基金運營的主要資助項目。

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