龔鵬程對(duì)話海外學(xué)者第六十期：在后現(xiàn)代情境中，被技術(shù)統(tǒng)治的人類(lèi)社會(huì)，只有強(qiáng)化交談、重建溝通倫理，才能獲得文化新生的力量。這不是誰(shuí)的理論，而是每個(gè)人都應(yīng)實(shí)踐的活動(dòng)。龔鵬程先生遊走世界，并曾主持過(guò)“世界漢學(xué)研究中心”。我們會(huì)陸續(xù)推出“龔鵬程對(duì)話海外學(xué)者”系列文章，請(qǐng)他對(duì)話一些學(xué)界有意義的靈魂。范圍不局限于漢學(xué)，會(huì)涉及多種學(xué)科。以期深山長(zhǎng)谷之水，四面而出。

彼得·卡普利教授（Professor Peter Cappelli）

美國(guó)賓夕法尼亞大學(xué)管理學(xué)教授、人力資源中心總監(jiān)

龔鵬程教授：您好。在您題為《財(cái)富創(chuàng)造者：創(chuàng)造中國(guó)偉大的全球公司的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者》一書(shū)中，您分析了中國(guó)公司的商業(yè)文化，例如柳傳志的聯(lián)想和王石的萬(wàn)科。 有趣的是，您提到中國(guó)的商業(yè)模式為美國(guó)和世界各地的高管提供了寶貴的經(jīng)驗(yàn)教訓(xùn)。 您認(rèn)為中國(guó)商業(yè)方式的主要優(yōu)勢(shì)是什么？

彼得·卡普利教授：龔教授，您好。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)中國(guó)對(duì)待私營(yíng)企業(yè)的方式有幾個(gè)優(yōu)勢(shì)。 一是他們強(qiáng)調(diào)通過(guò)教育和反思來(lái)進(jìn)行自我提升，這類(lèi)似于共產(chǎn)黨長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)采用的方法。 他們讀了很多書(shū)、他們聘請(qǐng)專(zhuān)家教他們、他們參加高管教育課程等等。 換句話說(shuō)，他們?yōu)榱俗约旱纳虡I(yè)活動(dòng)而成為了學(xué)生。 中國(guó)高管已經(jīng)將自己的學(xué)習(xí)經(jīng)驗(yàn)帶入了公司和下屬，尤其是自主學(xué)習(xí)。 在這些公司中，所有高管都有必須遵循的閱讀清單，有時(shí)還要為他們閱讀的材料準(zhǔn)備書(shū)評(píng)，這是很常見(jiàn)的。

在組織規(guī)劃方面，學(xué)習(xí)意味著嘗試然后從經(jīng)驗(yàn)中適應(yīng)，如果經(jīng)驗(yàn)失敗，商人有時(shí)會(huì)轉(zhuǎn)向其他事情。支持這種戰(zhàn)略敏捷性的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)原則，是保持對(duì)增長(zhǎng)抱有長(zhǎng)期的愿景。 他們認(rèn)為盈利能力是增長(zhǎng)的最終產(chǎn)品。

這似乎運(yùn)作良好，因?yàn)樵鲩L(zhǎng)為他們帶來(lái)了規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)，從而降低了成本，這似乎是總體上最確定且可以說(shuō)是長(zhǎng)期成功的重要因素。公司能夠快速變革的部分原因，是執(zhí)行變革的人有理由確信，如果自上而下的創(chuàng)新或變革沒(méi)有奏效，他們不會(huì)受到責(zé)備或失去工作。

另一個(gè)優(yōu)勢(shì)是，商業(yè)領(lǐng)袖沒(méi)有過(guò)多關(guān)注投資界追求利潤(rùn)最大化的短期需求。股票所有權(quán)占比不是治理的基礎(chǔ)，尤其是在英聯(lián)邦國(guó)家。 中國(guó)商界領(lǐng)袖向董事會(huì)尋求想法和指導(dǎo)，而不是尋求批準(zhǔn)：董事會(huì)不被視為股東利益的代表。

中國(guó)公司與世界各地的創(chuàng)業(yè)公司有很多共同之處。 這些屬性之一是權(quán)力集中在老板手中，這使他們能夠迅速做出決定。 這也意味著老板是無(wú)所不能的：忠誠(chéng)于個(gè)人領(lǐng)導(dǎo)而不是一套政策或機(jī)構(gòu)，這使得調(diào)整這些政策和做法更容易。 在關(guān)于誰(shuí)負(fù)責(zé)或者競(jìng)爭(zhēng)議程的過(guò)程中是沒(méi)有干擾的。 他們也不像在美國(guó)那樣擔(dān)心惡意收購(gòu)或?qū)I(yè)務(wù)出售給其他人，這可能會(huì)使高管們擔(dān)心他們的工作保障，并專(zhuān)注于他們?cè)谄渌胤降穆殬I(yè)前景。

We found several strengths in the Chinese approach to private enterprises. One was their emphasis on self-improvement through education and reflection that is analogous to approaches long embraced by the Communist Party. They read a lot, they hire experts to teach them, they go to executive education programs, and so forth. In other words, they become students of the topics before them. Chinese executives have carried their own learning experience into the firm and onto their subordinates, especially self-directed learning. It is very common in these companies for all the executives to have reading lists that they must follow and sometimes to prepare book reviews on the materials they read.

At the organizational level, learning means trying and then adapting from the experience, sometimes shifting to something else if the experience failed. Underpinning this leadership principle of strategic agility is maintaining a long-term vision of growth. They believe that profitability is an end product of growth. This seems to have worked well as growth has given them scale economies, which has reduced costs, something which appears to be overall the most certain and arguably important factor in longer-term success. Part of the reason the companies can change quickly is because the people executing the changes are reasonably sure that they will not be blamed and lose their jobs if the innovation or change – which comes from the top down – does not work out.

Another strength has been that business leaders have not paid much attention to the short-term demands of the investment community to maximize profits. Stock ownership is not the basis for governance as it is especially in commonwealth countries. Chinese business leaders turn to their board for ideas and guidance and not for approval: boards are not seen as representatives of shareholder interests.

Chinese companies have much in common with entrepreneurial companies everywhere. One of those attributes is that power is concentrated in the hands of the boss, which allows them to make decisions quickly. It also means that the boss is all-powerful: loyalty is to the individual leader rather than to a set of policies or institutions, and that makes it easier to adjust those policies and practices. There is no confusion as to who is in charge or about competing agendas. Nor is their concern as in the US of hostile takeovers or selling the business to someone else, which might make executives worry about their job security and focus on their career prospects elsewhere.

龔鵬程教授：在您的書(shū)中，您強(qiáng)調(diào)了中國(guó)企業(yè)的成功和優(yōu)勢(shì)，并為美國(guó)的高管提供了寶貴的經(jīng)驗(yàn)教訓(xùn)。 然而，人們可以反過(guò)來(lái)問(wèn)，中國(guó)高管可以從美國(guó)的商業(yè)方式中學(xué)到哪些寶貴的經(jīng)驗(yàn)教訓(xùn)？ 換句話說(shuō)，美國(guó)商業(yè)方式的主要優(yōu)勢(shì)是什么？

彼得·卡普利教授：中國(guó)企業(yè)和商業(yè)領(lǐng)袖必須考慮下一個(gè)階段，而不僅僅是如何快速增長(zhǎng)。 這集中在如何開(kāi)展大型業(yè)務(wù)上。 他們通過(guò)家長(zhǎng)制領(lǐng)導(dǎo)和類(lèi)似氏族的企業(yè)文化做到了這一點(diǎn)。 在許多方面，這是所有成功的創(chuàng)業(yè)公司的共同問(wèn)題——蘋(píng)果和微軟等美國(guó)科技公司面臨著類(lèi)似的挑戰(zhàn)。 根本不可能以“大老板”模式經(jīng)營(yíng)大型全球性公司，領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者掌控一切。

要看到這一點(diǎn)，請(qǐng)考慮一家中國(guó)公司在中國(guó)境外運(yùn)營(yíng)其第一個(gè)部門(mén)時(shí)所面臨的問(wèn)題。 國(guó)家文化會(huì)有所不同，法律結(jié)構(gòu)會(huì)有所不同，業(yè)務(wù)需求和挑戰(zhàn)也會(huì)有所不同。 在如此不同的地方，使用中國(guó)模式根本不適用于非中國(guó)勞動(dòng)力。 我們?nèi)绾卧凇按罄习濉蹦Ｊ较伦龅竭@一點(diǎn)成為了問(wèn)題，在這種模式下，當(dāng)中國(guó)的 CEO對(duì)他們所面臨的環(huán)境知之甚少時(shí)，中國(guó)的 CEO 該如何進(jìn)行審批境外的意見(jiàn)？

一個(gè)相關(guān)的問(wèn)題是繼承問(wèn)題，這是大多數(shù)中國(guó)公司尚未面對(duì)的問(wèn)題。 西方公司的一個(gè)明顯教訓(xùn)是，公司的創(chuàng)始人根本不擅長(zhǎng)挑選繼任者。 他們未來(lái)的個(gè)人利益不一定是公司的利益。 他們通常希望家庭成員或繼任者能夠繼續(xù)他們的做法，而不是領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者會(huì)在環(huán)境不可避免地發(fā)生變化時(shí)弄清楚該怎么做。

中國(guó)公司并不擅長(zhǎng)培養(yǎng)能夠在一定程度上自主經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)務(wù)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者——這在國(guó)外業(yè)務(wù)中是必要的——或者能夠管理整體業(yè)務(wù)并真正控制損益的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者。 要做到這一點(diǎn)，需要讓員工有機(jī)會(huì)經(jīng)營(yíng)較小的組織。 這些公司在這方面做得并不好。

一個(gè)相關(guān)問(wèn)題與管理公司的一般規(guī)則和程序有關(guān)，尤其是管理員工。 顯然，在中國(guó)，員工依賴(lài)現(xiàn)任老板來(lái)照顧他們的情況并非如此，因?yàn)橹袊?guó)有一個(gè)強(qiáng)勁的勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)可以進(jìn)行橫向職業(yè)調(diào)動(dòng)。 為了讓員工留在開(kāi)放的勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)，需要能夠預(yù)先讓候選人了解他們?cè)谛匠旰透＠⒙殬I(yè)發(fā)展等方面的期望。 這與政策和實(shí)踐，簡(jiǎn)而言之，現(xiàn)代人力資源系統(tǒng)無(wú)關(guān)。

隨著公司變得越來(lái)越大、越來(lái)越分散，員工因?yàn)閷?duì)大老板的忠誠(chéng)而總是為公司的利益行事的想法——他們可能永遠(yuǎn)不會(huì)遇到——這是不可信的。 他們可能需要內(nèi)部控制和監(jiān)控系統(tǒng)。而在小型、快速發(fā)展的公司中，這些系統(tǒng)被認(rèn)為是不必要的，并且會(huì)阻礙速度和對(duì)成本的控制。 這些公司從前資本主義時(shí)期繼承下來(lái)的紀(jì)律嚴(yán)明和忠誠(chéng)的勞動(dòng)力不再是既定的，因此實(shí)踐必須對(duì)此做出回應(yīng)。

老板經(jīng)常抵制這樣的發(fā)展，因?yàn)檫^(guò)于快速地發(fā)展所帶來(lái)的挑戰(zhàn)，不是他們以前處理過(guò)的：如果你是全能的老板，需要相當(dāng)多的自我意識(shí)和反思才能意識(shí)到你犯了錯(cuò)誤， 在這些中國(guó)公司中，他們不會(huì)經(jīng)常聽(tīng)到這樣的信息。

在美國(guó)，這就是為什么公司創(chuàng)始人經(jīng)常不得不被排擠的原因。 這在中國(guó)不會(huì)發(fā)生，因?yàn)槎聲?huì)無(wú)權(quán)這樣做。 因此，領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者有責(zé)任改變或知道何時(shí)下臺(tái)——后者不太可能。

Chinese businesses and business leaders have to think about the next phase beyond simply how to grow fast. That centers on how to run big operations. They have done so with paternalistic leadership and a clan-like corporate culture. In many ways, this is a common issue for all entrepreneurial companies that succeed – US tech companies like Apple and Microsoft faced similar challenges. It is simply not possible to run large, global companies with a “big boss” model where the leader has their fingers on everything.

To see this, consider the problems a Chinese company faces in operating its first divisions outside China. The national culture will be different, the legal structure will be different, the business needs and challenges will be different. Using the Chinese model will simply not work with a non-Chinese workforce in a location that is so different. How can we do that with a “big boss” model where the CEO in China has to approve our decisions – without knowing much about the context we are facing?

A related problem is succession, which most of the Chinese companies have yet to face. One of the clear lessons from western companies is that founders of companies are simply not good at picking successors. Their personal interests going forward are not necessarily those of the companies. They often want family members in charge or successors who will continue their approaches rather than leaders who will figure out what to do when the context inevitably changes.

Chinese companies have not been good at developing leaders who can run operations with some autonomy – as is necessary in foreign operations – or who can manage an overall businesses with real control over profit and loss. To do that requires giving employees opportunity to run smaller organizations. These companies have not been good at that.

A related issue has to do with general rules and procedures for managing companies, especially managing employees. It is obviously not the case in China that employees are dependent on their current boss to look after them as there is a robust labor market for lateral career moves. To keep employees in open labor market requires being able to offer candidates up front an understanding as to what they can expect in terms of pay and benefits, career advancement, and so forth. That is not possible to do with policies and practices, in short, modern human resource systems.

As companies grow bigger and more dispersed, the idea that employees will always act in the interest of the company because of loyalty to the big boss – who they may never meet – is not credible. They are likely to need the systems of internal control and monitoring that in smaller, fast-growing companies were seen as unnecessary and impediments to speed and low-cost. The disciplined and loyal workforces that these companies inherited from the pre-capitalist period are no longer a given, and so practices have to respond to that.

Bossesoften resist these developments because they were not what they have done before and not what has worked before: If you are the all-powerful boss, it takes a considerable amount of a self-awareness and reflection to realize that you have made mistakes, and in these Chinese companies, they are not going to hear that message often. In the US, this has been the reason why company founders often have to be pushed out. That will not happen in China because boards have no power to do so. Therefore the burden is on the leaders to either change or know when to step down – the latter is less likely.

龔鵬程教授：“績(jī)效管理革命”為什么會(huì)發(fā)生？ 公共部門(mén)和大學(xué)是否應(yīng)該接受這場(chǎng)革命？

彼得·卡普利教授：二戰(zhàn)后，美國(guó)率先提出了通過(guò)復(fù)雜而嚴(yán)格的績(jī)效制度來(lái)評(píng)估個(gè)人員工績(jī)效的想法。 對(duì)于白領(lǐng)來(lái)說(shuō)，這個(gè)想法是幫助他們發(fā)展成為高管和領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者——或者至少找到優(yōu)秀的人。 另一個(gè)好處，是讓在他們目前的工作中做得更好。這是一個(gè)較低的優(yōu)先級(jí)，因?yàn)閮?yōu)秀的員工可以快速跨職位工作。 隨著培養(yǎng)員工從事更大工作的興趣下降，這一首要任務(wù)開(kāi)始減弱。 到 1980 年代后期，績(jī)效管理的當(dāng)務(wù)之急是幫助人們?cè)谀壳暗慕巧凶龅酶茫珜?shí)現(xiàn)這一目標(biāo)的方法，主要集中在對(duì)員工創(chuàng)造財(cái)務(wù)上的激勵(lì)。 這個(gè)想法的問(wèn)題便是——這個(gè)想法很大程度上都是激勵(lì)性的措施。

因此，我們花了很多時(shí)間試圖讓員工對(duì)他們過(guò)去的行為負(fù)責(zé)，并期望我們能夠挑選出表現(xiàn)不佳的員工，并利用績(jī)效加薪和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)來(lái)激勵(lì)優(yōu)秀的員工。

事實(shí)證明，挑選表現(xiàn)不佳的員工非常困難。在低通脹時(shí)代，微薄的績(jī)效工資預(yù)算削弱了激勵(lì)措施，而問(wèn)責(zé)制的重點(diǎn)則削弱了提高績(jī)效和培養(yǎng)人才的能力。

這場(chǎng)革命中，沒(méi)有人認(rèn)為這種方法是有效的。 員工是否基本上是自主的，領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者的工作只是提供胡蘿卜和棍棒，推動(dòng)好人，擺脫壞人？ 或者他們是否具有可塑性，以至于一個(gè)好的主管和教練可以改變他們的表現(xiàn)方式？ 這是關(guān)于財(cái)務(wù)和內(nèi)在獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)重要性的長(zhǎng)期爭(zhēng)論中的一部分。

這場(chǎng)革命改變了績(jī)效管理只是讓員工對(duì)其工作績(jī)效負(fù)責(zé)的觀念的轉(zhuǎn)變。原因之一是認(rèn)識(shí)到培養(yǎng)員工技能，不僅僅需要他們的動(dòng)力。專(zhuān)業(yè)服務(wù)公司在這里提供了最大的推動(dòng)力，因?yàn)樗麄兊纳虡I(yè)模式，需要獲得相對(duì)不熟練的新員工才能表現(xiàn)得足夠好，從而獲得高收費(fèi)率。

另一個(gè)原因是，當(dāng)組織不斷變化，需要的任務(wù)經(jīng)常變化，監(jiān)督往往不止一個(gè)人，新的“敏捷”項(xiàng)目管理模式的特點(diǎn)，是對(duì)項(xiàng)目的各個(gè)方面不斷反饋。那不應(yīng)該也包括個(gè)人表現(xiàn)嗎？推動(dòng)變革的最后一個(gè)因素，是認(rèn)識(shí)到建立在給員工打分的評(píng)估系統(tǒng)存在嚴(yán)重偏差，因?yàn)橹鞴芟到y(tǒng)地給與自己更相似的人打高分。

所有新方法的一個(gè)共同主題，是用遵循自然工作周期，用主管和下屬之間關(guān)于績(jī)效的對(duì)話來(lái)取代一次性的年度評(píng)估過(guò)程。理想情況下，它們發(fā)生在項(xiàng)目完成、關(guān)鍵可交付成果出現(xiàn)時(shí)、問(wèn)題出現(xiàn)時(shí)等關(guān)鍵時(shí)刻。

對(duì)話的重點(diǎn)，是解決工作表現(xiàn)中的問(wèn)題以及培養(yǎng)未來(lái)的技能。持續(xù)的實(shí)時(shí)對(duì)話，旨在識(shí)別和解決與員工及其工作相關(guān)的影響其績(jī)效的問(wèn)題。這是一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單的想法，但在較低級(jí)別的管理人員中遭到強(qiáng)烈抵制，部分原因是這需要與下屬談?wù)摴ぷ鳎郧懊磕曛话l(fā)生一次，而且敷衍了事。

這不一定需要更多時(shí)間，但確實(shí)需要合理地持續(xù)關(guān)注下屬以及他們?cè)谧鍪裁础＿@對(duì)主管來(lái)說(shuō)更難的一個(gè)原因是，他們也被賦予了個(gè)人貢獻(xiàn)者任務(wù)：他們對(duì)這些負(fù)責(zé)，而不一定對(duì)他們作為主管的工作做得有多好而負(fù)責(zé)。所以“打勾”比談話更簡(jiǎn)單，應(yīng)為前者只需在年底填寫(xiě)表格即可。

與管理中的許多變革一樣，這場(chǎng)革命是成功還是回歸舊方式，很大程度上取決于企業(yè)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者給予它的關(guān)注程度，因?yàn)樗鼜母旧鲜亲兏锕芾韱?wèn)題。

疫情令人驚訝地為主管和下屬之間的真正對(duì)話創(chuàng)造了更多機(jī)會(huì)，因?yàn)樵谶h(yuǎn)程工作中，所有對(duì)話都必須是有目的的：主管可以假裝他們正在與下屬交談，因?yàn)樗麄冊(cè)谝黄鹪谵k公室。 只是他們沒(méi)有談?wù)摴ぷ鳎液苌僬務(wù)撓聦俚谋憩F(xiàn)。

The US pioneered the idea of sophisticated and rigorous efforts to assess the performance of individual employees after WWII. For white collar workers, the idea was to help them develop into executives and leaders – or at least to find the good ones. The secondary interest was to get better at their current jobs, a lower priority because the good employees were moving across roles quickly. That first priority began to fade as the interest in developing employees for bigger jobs declined. By the late 1980s, the priority was to help people get better in their current roles, but way to do it focused largely on creating financial incentives to do so. The idea was that the problems were largely motivational. As a result, we spent a great deal of time trying to hold employees accountable for their past behavior with the expectation that we could then sort out poor performers and use the rewards of merit pay increases and competition to motivate the good workers.

Sorting out poor performers proved surprisingly difficult, tiny merit pay budgets in an era of low inflation undercut incentives, and the accountability focus undermined the ability to improve performance and develop talent.

The revolution was a recognition that no one thought this approach was working. Are employees basically self-directed, such that the job of leaders is just to provide the carrots and sticks that push along the good ones and get rid of the bad ones? Or are they malleable, such that a good supervisor and coaching can change the way they perform? This was part of a long-running dispute over the importance of financial and intrinsic rewards.

The revolution was a shift away from the idea that performance management was just about holding employees accountable for their job performance. One reason was the recognition that developing employee skills required more than just their motivation. The professional service firms provided the biggest push here because their business models require getting relatively unskilled new hires to perform well enough to merit high billing rates. Another reason is that the annual cycle for performance appraisals was ineffective when organizations were constantly changing, required tasks altered frequently, supervision often came from more than one person, and the new “agile” models of project management featured constant feedback on all aspects of the project. Shouldn’t that also include individual performance. The final factor pushing for change was the recognition that the appraisal system built on giving employees scores was heavily biased in that supervisors systematically gave higher scores to those who were more similar to themselves.

A common theme across all of the new approaches has been to replace the one time annual appraisal process with conversations about performance between supervisors and subordinates that follow the natural cycle of work. They occur ideally when projects finish, when key deliverables occur, when problems pop up, and so forth. The conversations focus on solving problems in job performance and also developing skills for the future. Continuous, real-time conversations designed to identify and fix problems related to employees and their jobs that affect their performance. It is a simple idea but one that has been fiercely resisted at lower levels of management in part because it requires talking to subordinates about work, something that before happened only once a year and in a perfunctory manner. It did not necessarily take more time, but it did require paying reasonably continuous attention to subordinates and what they were doing. One reason this was harder for supervisors is that they have also been given individual contributor tasks: they are accountable for those and not necessarily for how good a job they do as supervisors. It is simpler to “tick-the-box” and just fill out a form at the end of the year.

As with many changes in management, whether this revolution will succeed or fall back into the old ways depends largely on the amount of attention that business leaders give it as it is fundamentally a change management problem. The pandemic surprisingly created more opportunities for real conversations between supervisors and subordinates because with remote work, all conversations had to be purposeful: supervisors could pretend that they were talking to their subordinates because they were together in the office. It was just that they were not talking about work and rarely ever about how the subordinate was doing.

龔鵬程教授：在您的文章《大學(xué)教育的回報(bào)：美國(guó)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)》中，您提到幾個(gè)國(guó)家正在朝著美國(guó)高等教育模式的方向發(fā)展，即高等教育作為一種私人投資，學(xué)生承擔(dān)相當(dāng)大的成本。 但是，對(duì)于個(gè)別學(xué)生來(lái)說(shuō)，獲得大學(xué)學(xué)位真的能帶來(lái)經(jīng)濟(jì)上的回報(bào)嗎？

彼得·卡普利教授：毫無(wú)疑問(wèn)，大學(xué)畢業(yè)生比那些沒(méi)有上過(guò)大學(xué)的人賺的錢(qián)要多得多。 這與說(shuō)每個(gè)人上大學(xué)都能得到回報(bào)是不一樣的。

第一個(gè)問(wèn)題很重要，就是很多人上了大學(xué)，卻從未畢業(yè)。 很難確定有多少人永遠(yuǎn)不會(huì)回去完成學(xué)位，但最好的證據(jù)表明，絕大多數(shù)上大學(xué)的學(xué)生沒(méi)有按時(shí)畢業(yè)——也就是說(shuō)，他們?cè)谒哪陜?nèi)沒(méi)有完成四年制學(xué)位。 即使在開(kāi)始六年后也是如此。

如果一個(gè)人沒(méi)有畢業(yè)，僅僅因?yàn)樯洗髮W(xué)而不是完成學(xué)業(yè)就幾乎沒(méi)有經(jīng)濟(jì)回報(bào)，但一個(gè)人仍然需要承擔(dān)與大學(xué)相關(guān)的所有費(fèi)用，包括學(xué)生貸款。

鑒于我們對(duì)大學(xué)的所有關(guān)注，令人驚訝的是，我們真的不知道為什么大學(xué)畢業(yè)生比沒(méi)有畢業(yè)的同齡人能賺更多的錢(qián)。

一種解釋是，他們甚至在上大學(xué)之前就更有能力：他們的家庭有更多的錢(qián)和社會(huì)資源，學(xué)生本身更聰明等等，所以無(wú)論如何他們可能會(huì)做得更好。

第二個(gè)原因是畢業(yè)（未參加）向雇主發(fā)出信號(hào)，表明這些人有能力保留和其他有用的屬性。換句話說(shuō)，它只是將人們分類(lèi)。

第三種解釋是，他們學(xué)到的技能只是有用的。對(duì)于離開(kāi)大學(xué)成為護(hù)士或工程師的專(zhuān)業(yè)工作來(lái)說(shuō)，后者當(dāng)然是正確的，但這并不能解釋為什么文科或其他非職業(yè)學(xué)位畢業(yè)生的收入更高。我們確實(shí)知道，有些學(xué)校的畢業(yè)生掙的錢(qián)不足以抵消上學(xué)的成本——也就是說(shuō)，這對(duì)他們沒(méi)有回報(bào)。這些學(xué)校的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)很低，這意味著他們招收的學(xué)生能力較差，而且他們似乎學(xué)得不多。

所以簡(jiǎn)短的回答，是這取決于不同的情況。 上大學(xué)并大致按時(shí)畢業(yè)并上一所具有相當(dāng)高標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的大學(xué)的學(xué)生可能會(huì)比沒(méi)有上大學(xué)的學(xué)生掙得更多。 如果他們追求的是職業(yè)的大學(xué)專(zhuān)業(yè)，例如護(hù)理，則尤其如此。

當(dāng)我們看到那些聲稱(chēng)學(xué)位“回報(bào)”最高的學(xué)校時(shí)，他們不一定是那些畢業(yè)生賺大錢(qián)的學(xué)校。 他們是很少有畢業(yè)生進(jìn)入低薪工作的學(xué)校。 工程學(xué)校不會(huì)培養(yǎng)出富有的畢業(yè)生，但也不會(huì)培養(yǎng)出賺取最低工資的畢業(yè)生。

學(xué)費(fèi)和上大學(xué)的其他費(fèi)用，當(dāng)然也會(huì)影響回報(bào)——如果成本較低，經(jīng)濟(jì)收益會(huì)更大——但這些成本并不總是那么明顯。

60% 的美國(guó)大學(xué)生獲得某種形式的經(jīng)濟(jì)援助，這通常涉及支付低于規(guī)定價(jià)格的學(xué)費(fèi)。 去一所提供各種經(jīng)濟(jì)援助的高學(xué)費(fèi)的富裕大學(xué)可能比去一所學(xué)費(fèi)較低但折扣很少的州立大學(xué)便宜。 過(guò)去，那些以經(jīng)濟(jì)援助形式提供的折扣完全是基于需要——錢(qián)少的孩子付的錢(qián)少。 現(xiàn)在情況不一定如此，因?yàn)閷W(xué)校會(huì)為他們真正想要的學(xué)生去降低價(jià)格。

There is no doubt that college graduates make considerably more money than those who do not go to college. That is not the same thing as saying that it pays off for everyone to go to college. The first issue, which is not trivial, is that many people go to college and never graduate. It is difficult to know with certainty how many will never go back and finish a degree, but the best evidence suggests that the vast majority of students who go to college do not graduate on time – that is, in four years they have not completed a four-year degree. That is true even six years after starting. If one does not graduate, there is very little financial return simply from attending college and not finishing, and yet one still has all the costs associated with college, including student loans.

Given all the attention we give to college, it is perhaps surprising that we really have little idea why college graduates make more money than their peers who do not graduate. One explanation is that they are more able even before they go to college: their families have more money and social resources, the students themselves are smarter, etc., so they probably would have done better anyway. A second reason is that graduating (not attending) signals to employers that those individuals have the ability to preserve and other attributes that are useful. In other words, it just sorts people out. The third explanation is that the skills they learn are just useful. The latter is certainly true for professional jobs where one leaves college to be a nurse or an engineer, but it does not explain why liberal arts or other non-vocational degree grads earn more. We do know that the graduates of some schools do not make enough to offset the costs of going – that is, it does not pay off for them. These are schools with low standards, which means they are taking in less able students, and they do not appear to be learning much.

So the short answer is that it depends. Students who go to college and graduate roughly on time and go to a college that has reasonably high standards probably will earn more than if they had not gone to college. That is especially so if they pursue a college major that is vocational, such as nursing. When one looks at the schools that claim to have the highest “return” on the degree, they are not necessarily those whose graduates make a lot of money. They are schools where very few graduates enter low-wage jobs. Engineering schools do not produce wealthy grads, but neither do they produce grads earning minimum wages.

Tuition costs and the other expenses of attending college certainly affect the return as well – the financial benefits are greater if the costs are lower – but those costs are not always so obvious. Sixty percent of US college students get financial aid of some kind, which typically involves paying less than the stated prices for tuition. It may well be cheaper to go to a wealthy college with high tuition that offers various kinds of financial aid than to a state university where the tuition costs are lower but there are few discounts. In the past, those discounts in the form of financial aid were based entirely on need – kids with less money paid less. Now that is not necessarily the case as schools cut the price for students they really want.

龔鵬程，1956年生于臺(tái)北，臺(tái)灣師范大學(xué)博士，當(dāng)代著名學(xué)者和思想家。著作已出版一百五十多本。

辦有大學(xué)、出版社、雜志社、書(shū)院等，并規(guī)劃城市建設(shè)、主題園區(qū)等多處。講學(xué)于世界各地。并在北京、上海、杭州、臺(tái)北、巴黎、日本、澳門(mén)等地舉辦過(guò)書(shū)法展。現(xiàn)為中國(guó)孔子博物館名譽(yù)館長(zhǎng)、美國(guó)龔鵬程基金會(huì)主席。